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What is “personal data” for the purposes of European and UK data protection (DP) 
legislation?  Since European DP law controls only  the automatic or partially 
automatic processing of “personal data” relating to “data subjects”,  how this phrase is 
defined is a crucial  step in ascertaining how wide the protection of  DP law really is, 
and to what extent it safeguards personal privacy in the information society. To date, 
somewhat surprisingly, there has been relatively little judicial guidance in UK law or 
in the European Court of Justice on this point1.  Now however the scope of “personal 
data” has been narrowed in the UK at least by the controversial Court of Appeal 
decision in Durant v FSA2. Although the case itself is about disclosure of information 
in the financial services sector, somewhat unpredictably the  main impact of Durant
has been in what at first blush seems to be a remotely connected area, that of the field 
of legal regulation of closed circuit TV cameras (CCTV)3.  This note will focus on 
that domain.
Section 1(1) of the Data Protection Act 1998, implementing Art 2(a) of the EC Data 
Protection Directive 19954, defines “personal data” as 
“data which relate to a living individual who can be identified
a) from those data, or
b) from those data and other information which is in the 
possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, the 
data controller….” [italics added]
Until recently, a wide definition of “personal data”, tailored to fulfil the purposes of 
the DP legislation – namely to protect personal privacy – was anticipated by most 
commentators.  However in the first UK case to grapple in detail with this issue, 
Durant v FSA5, this assumed wide interpretation of “personal data” was unexpectedly 
narrowed by the English Court of Appeal. The plaintiff Durant was in dispute with 
Barclays Bank, and made a complaint to the Financial Services Authority (FSA) 
about their behaviour, which lead to a confidential inquiry by the FSA into the bank’s 
conduct.  Durant, having already failed in various law suits against Barclays, now 
sought sight of all records held by the FSA which mentioned his name or in were in 
any way “related to” him, on the grounds that they were “personal data” of which he 
was the subject and to which, by ss 7(1) and 8(2) of the 1998 Act, he thus had rights 
                                                
1 The recent ECJ case of Lindqvist  ECJ, Case C-101/01, 6 November 2003 does touch on the issue of 
what is personal data, in relation to textual information uploaded to the Internet, but  has little that is 
incisive on this point, and is rather more significant on the definitions discussed therein of both 
“automatic processing” and “transfer to third country”. Basically all that is said about personal data is 
that it definitely includes “the name of a person in conjunction with his telephone coordinates or 
information about his working conditions or hobbies” (ibid, paras 25, 27). An interesting contrast is the 
recent Icelandic Supreme Court decision in the albeit very different context of  genetic/health data, 
Gudmundsdottir v  Iceland, November 27 2004, which by contrast to Durant  widens rather than 
narrows the national interpretation of “personal data”. 
2 2003] EWCA Civ 1746
3 See also Rowe H “CCTV Systems and the Data Protection Act 1998” (2004) 20 (3) CLSR 221.  
Durant lead directly to special guidance appearing as fast as possible on the Information 




5 Supra n 3.
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of access. The focus of Durant was thus primarily on how widely the phrase “relate 
to” in s 1(1) should be interpreted, so as to determine what information Durant had a 
right to see. This was an unexpected line of enquiry, as most academic commentary 
before that case had  largely anticipated dispute only about the meaning of the phrase 
“identified”6. 
A second area of dispute in Durant concerned redaction. Durant had already been 
given sight of some records by the FSA which had been “redacted” ie, had had the 
names of parties other than himself masked out so as to preserve their rights of 
privacy. DP law recognises that the privacy rights of third parties mentioned 
incidentally in records must be preserved notwithstanding the rights of subject access 
granted to data subjects. A balance is set up in s 7(4)(b) of the 1998 Act whereby if  a 
data controller cannot comply with the request in hand without disclosing information 
identifying another individual, he is not obliged to comply with the request unless 
either that other individual consents or it seems reasonable  to comply with the 
request without that consent. The question in Durant was whether Durant had a right 
to insist on seeing the un-redacted originals.7.
On the first point as to the width of the phrase “relate to”, two interpretations were 
quoted from the Shorter Oxford Dictionary: a narrower definition  which said it meant
“having reference to, concern” ; and  a wider definition , namely, “having some 
connection with, be connected to”.  Auld J, giving the lead opinion of the court, 
preferred the more restrictive definition. This was, he claimed, more in accordance 
with the purposes of the EC DP Directive, which were to give the data subject access 
to “information about himself” and not to specific documents per se.  Section 7 of the 
1998 Act, which implemented that part of the Directive  in the UK, similarly was not 
intended to be an “automatic key to information”, nor to allow access to any and all 
documents mentioning the data subject’s name, nor, importantly, any and all which 
might be retrieved by putting the subject’s name into a search engine. Instead, the aim 
of the data subject access rights was merely to enable the subject to protect his
privacy by finding out what the data controller held about him, and whether the 
processing of that data unlawfully infringed DP law. 
Auld J, having effectively narrowed the definition of “personal data”, then gave two 
examples of what types of information would now be subject to  DP protection. “Mere 
mention of the data subject in a document held by a data controller,” would not, he 
opined, “necessarily amount to his personal data.” Whether any particular information 
amounted to “personal data” would in general depend on where it fell in a “continuum 
of relevance or proximity” to the data subject. However, for guidance, if information 
was “biographical in a significant sense, that is, going beyond the recording of the 
putative data subject’s involvement in a matter or event that has no personal 
connotations” then it was likely to be regarded as “personal data” 8. 
                                                
6 See Jay R. and Hamilton A. Data Protection Law and Practice (2nd edn, 1999, Sweet and Maxwell); 
Carey P., Data Protection: A Practical Guide to UK and EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 
2004) pp14-15; Edwards L. “Canning the Spam” in Edwards L. and Waelde C. eds. Law and the 
Internet: A Framework for Electronic Commerce (Hart Publishing, 2000), pp 320-321 (on whether 
email addresses constitute personal data).
7 A third point discussed at length in Durant related to the definition of manual filing systems for DP 
purposes: however this is not relevant to the topic of personal data and CCTV regulation and so is here 
omitted.
8 Durant v FSA, supra n 3, para 28.
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Secondly, the matter of “focus” needed to be taken into account. 
“The information should have the data subject as its focus rather 
than some other person with whom he may have been involved or 
some transaction or event in which he may have figured or had an 
interest… In short, it is information that affects his privacy, whether 
in his personal or family life, business or professional capacity.”9
Accordingly in the case at hand, many or most of the records Durant sought, which 
bore his name as the complainant and which would be found if Durant’s name was 
used as a search term, but which fundamentally related to Barclay’s Bank rather than 
containing “biographical details” about Durant, or with a “focus” on Durant, were no 
longer to be regarded as “personal data” relating to Durant, and thus he had no rights 
as data subject to request access to those records.
On the redaction issue, the issue was largely a dead one by this stage as so much of 
what Durant was seeking access to was no longer defined as his “personal data”. 
Accordingly, Auld J merely noted, first, that if the identifiable references to other 
individuals contained in a record were not “personal data” relating to  the applicant 
under the new, narrower interpretation, then no balancing act need be done under s 
7(4) at all , ie, there was no need to decide if it was “reasonable” to release the 
information to  the applicant (and thus blanket redaction would in many cases be 
justified) .  Secondly, Auld J noted that even if references did constitute the “personal 
data” of both the applicant and another data subject, the data controller was not 
required to go through a first step of seeking the consent of  that other person if it was
reasonable to release the information. Thirdly, in deciding what was “reasonable”, a 
data controller should take into account the “legitimate interest” (if any) the data 
subject had in requesting the disclosure of the identity of another identifiable third 
party individual; and the degree to which the third party information necessarily 
formed part of the data subject’s own personal data to which access was sought. These 
last two factors were unlikely to come into conflict, as it would be “difficult to think” 
of a case where third party  information was so bound up with the applicant as to 
constitute “personal data” relating to the applicant and yet the applicant had no 
legitimate aim in obtaining that third party data.
Durant is a very understandable decision on its own facts. The Court of Appeal was 
stuck between the rock of data protection and the hard place of forcing a data 
controller like the FSA to effectively give access to all its confidential records to an 
individual who might abuse that access, and at the expense of its own external 
relationships with the community it regulates. The FSA is a regulatory body whose 
efficiency is (or was) based on being able to investigate financial organisations on a 
basis of confidentiality (it should be noted this case preceded the coming into force of 
relevant freedom of information legislation). Durant was, in essence, it seems, seeking 
not so much traditional data subject access rights, as rights of freedom of information 
in relation to the FSA investigation which UK law simply did not give him at the 
time.  He was also seeking a last bite at the cherry having failed to see Barclay’s Bank 
punished both in his own litigation and during the FSA investigation. It is clear the 
court felt he was more interested in finding out “personal data” about others rather 
than himself, with a view to more litigation, not protecting his own privacy – a 
fundamental misconception of what DP law is meant to do – hence, no doubt, the 
                                                
9 Ibid.
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repeated emphasis in the opinion on the purpose of the DP Directive being to protect 
the data subject’s own privacy.
But, perhaps unexpectedly, since the dust settled on Durant it has become apparent 
that its main impact is not on the domain of financial services (which is in any case 
now gearing itself up to provide publication schemes to meet with the new freedom of 
information requirements) but in the context of CCTV and data subjects whose 
images are captured on CCTV. Here, Durant unexpectedly ushers in a major change 
in the law and one which may well jeopardise the legitimate expectations of privacy  
of UK citizens and employees, and be out of step with the rest of the European DP 
community. Indeed, several commentators have suggested that the Durant decision 
should have been referred to the ECJ to provide a harmonised EC response10.  
Before Durant, when it was assumed that “personal data” would be given a relatively 
wide, non-technical interpretation, it appeared that CCTV images captured of living 
individuals would be subsumed under “personal data” so long as an individual who 
could be identified was depicted on-screen. This wide interpretation of personal data  
had the prima facie consequence that all operators of CCTV schemes however basic 
needed to notify with the Information Commissioner as data controllers and that all 
identifiable CCTV images were subject to the full DP requirements of fair processing 
(subject, of course, to exceptions such as those intended to promote law enforcement 
and national security11, and to promote freedom of expression12). Only pictures of 
people who could not be identified would fall outside the scope of the DP regime, 
and, even then, not if they could be identified if cross-referenced with other data the 
data processor had, or was likely to have : for example, images in stadiums or 
cinemas can be cross matched with seat records; shops can match images of 
customers paying with names on credit cards or store cards they used during the 
transaction13. 
After Durant, however, the scope of what falls within DP regulation in terms of 
CCTV suddenly looks very different. The Information Commissioner has speedily
issued detailed guidance on what the narrowing of the definition of “personal data”, 
and the two new guidelines as to “biographical” data, and “focus” mean in the context 
of CCTV14. The new guidance advises:
                                                
10 See Chalton S. “Reflections on Durant v FSA: The Court of Appeals’ interpretation of “personal 
data” in Durant v FSA – a welcome clarification or  a cat among the data protection pigeons?” (2004) 
20(3) CLSR 175; editor’s opinion of Mason’s Out-LAW Reports at http://www.outlaw.com, 19-5-
2004.
11 See ss 28 and 29, 1998 Act.
12 See s 32, 1998 Act. But note that the exemption of journalists from seven of the Eight DP principles 
(data security is still required) is limited by a “public interest” test: s 32(b). It is an open question if it 
could ever be in the “public interest” for a journalist to train a  CCTV camera on the door of (say) a 
celebrity’s home or place of work night and day – the result at the High Court stage in Campbell v 
MGM [2002] EWHC 499 (QB), where an award of damages for breach of DP rights, albeit nominal, 
was made to Ms Campbell in similar circumstances involving mere “still” press photographs, as 
opposed to CCTV, would seem to indicate not..




(2004) 1:2 SCRIPT-ed 346
“…If you have just a basic CCTV system, your use may no longer be 
covered by the DPA. This depends on what happens in practice. For 
example, small retailers would not be covered who: 
 only have a couple cameras, 
 can’t move them remotely, 
 just record on video tape whatever the cameras pick up, and 
 only give the recorded images to the police to investigate an 
incident in their shop.”
The shopkeepers would need to make sure that they do not use the images for their 
own purposes such as checking whether a member of staff is doing their job properly, 
because if they did, then that person would be the focus of attention and they would 
be trying to learn things about them so the use would then be covered by the DPA. 
It sounds like many users of basic CCTV systems are not covered by the 
DPA, is there an easy way to tell? 
Think about what you are trying to achieve by using CCTV. Is it there for you to learn 
about individuals’ activities for your own business purposes (such as monitoring a 
member of staff giving concern)? If so, then it will still be covered. However if you can 
answer ‘no’ to all the following 3 questions you will not be covered: 
 Do you ever operate the cameras remotely in order to zoom in/out or point in 
different directions to pick up what particular people are doing? 
 Do you ever use the images to try to observe someone’s behaviour for your 
own business purposes such as monitoring staff members? 
 Do you ever give the recorded images to anyone other than a law enforcement 
body such as the police?”
As can be seen from the above, the Information Commissioner seems to be taking the 
approach that if a simple CCTV system is not intended to (or is not physically able to)  
“focus” on any given individual, nor is intended to provide specific intelligence of a 
“biographical” nature about a particular person (for example, follow a suspect 
employee around) then it is not collecting “personal data relating to” any person  at 
all, despite the fact that images of living identifiable persons are , in fact, captured. 
And since no personal data is collected, there is no need to respect the rules of data 
protection, nor for the system operator to notify the Information Commissioner as a 
data controller. The CCTV system, it seems, entirely drops out of the DP net.
What about more sophisticated systems?  The guidance continues:
“In many CCTV schemes, such as are used in town centres or by 
large retailers, CCTV systems are more sophisticated. They are 
used to focus on the activities of particular people either by 
directing cameras at an individual’s activities, looking out for 
particular individuals or examining recorded CCTV images to find 
things out about the people in them such as identifying a criminal or 
a witness or assessing how an employee is performing. These 
(2004) 1:2 SCRIPT-ed 347
activities will still be covered by the DPA but some of the images 
they record will no longer be covered. So if only a general scene is 
recorded without any incident occurring and with no focus on any 
particular individual’s activities, these images are not covered by 
the DPA. In short, organisations using CCTV for anything other 
than the most basic of surveillance will have to comply with the 
DPA but not all their images will be covered in all circumstances. 
The simple rule of thumb is that you need to decide whether the 
image you have taken is aimed at learning about a particular 
person's activities.” [italics added]
This leaves open the possibility that although a CCTV system of a certain complexity 
may “qualify” for  the DP regime  – with the result that  the CCTV operator will need, 
for example, to notify  the Information Commissioner  as to the purposes for which he 
is collecting the data -  the images of persons which are collected incidentally, without 
“focus”, will not be regarded as “personal data”. This mean the key obligations DP 
imposes from the point of collection, such as fair processing, data security and  no 
unreasonable data retention, disappear. Furthermore, persons whose images are so 
incidentally collected, and which are thus not categorised as their “personal data”, will 
have no rights to access or correct these images under subject access rules, nor, 
perhaps, to control how they are processed. They will have in principle, it seems,  no 
right to demand that those images be “redacted” – in this context, edited out or 
masked or pixellated into obscurity – if  a tape on which they feature incidentally is 
given to  another data subject featured therein -  as, extending the dictum of Auld J, 
the “reasonableness test” under s 7(4) of the 1998 Act, which requires the data 
controller to balance the access rights of the applicant data subject against the privacy 
rights of any other party whose personal details are disclosed, will not cut in if those 
details are not  deemed “personal data” of the third party captured15. (And since 
editing is an expensive process which many CCTV controllers will need to contract 
out and pay for, a simple request, un-backed by law, is unlikely to cut any ice.) 
In essence, the degree to which these  CCTV images are part of the personal private 
sphere of the individual identifiable therein,  has ceased to be the focus of the law’s 
concern; what will really matter, in practical terms, is the intentions and goals of the 
CCTV operator when he or she sets up the cameras, and how this is translated into 
the physical set up and management routine of the system. This has potentially 
staggering implications in the CCTV field. What if the London Congestion Charging 
Authority – whose CCTV cameras are primarily intended to track  license plates so as 
to identify who should be paying the toll -  incidentally collect images of semi-famous 
celebrities in potentially embarrassing situations (eg, badly dressed or with unstyled 
hair)?  Leaving aside issues of  common law privacy (see below), in DP terms it 
seems these pictures might well not be “personal data” at all, because the celebrity 
would not have been the “focus” of the system nor does the picture tell you anything 
very “biographical” about  him or her. Their presence is incidental to the data 
collector’s notified purposes. Accordingly the DP regime would not apply at the point 
of collection. The London Congestion Charging Authority’s notification says nothing 
about one of the purposes of their data collection activities being to collect pictures 
which might one day make their unwanted way to paparrazi – but  it would become a 
                                                
15 Duran v FSA, supra n 3, para 55.
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possibility, with no breach of the First Data Protection principle which requires that 
methods of collection of data be “fair”.  What then happens to the “reasonable 
expectations” and privacy rights of the millions (including but not limited to 
celebrities) who journey into central London by car every day in reach of the camera 
eyes?
Of course it could be argued that once an incidental image captured of – say – Kylie 
Minogue, had been discovered and offered to the Daily Mail for a four-figure sum,
that data now would certainly become “personal data” relating to, and identifying, Ms 
Minogue, and thus the processing of it, in the form of  distribution or sale, would be 
controlled by  DP law, which would spring into action as a relevant legal regime.  
Indeed this seems to be the interpretation favoured by the Information Commissioner, 
since in the guidance notes quoted above, the third question the operator of a small 
CCTV system must ask to know if he or she still needs to notify under DP law post-
Durant,  is “Do you ever give the recorded images to anyone other than a law 
enforcement body such as the police?”. 
However although this interpretation – the idea that CCTV images might not be 
“personal data” at the moment of collection but could be retrospectively constructed 
as such - is possible it is (a) still not very satisfactory as requirements of fair 
processing should operate from the moment of collection, not post hoc, and (b) 
though not ruled out by Durant, does not seem on close scrutiny to be backed by it 
either. Auld J’s opinion seems impliedly limited to requiring an assessment of 
whether information is to be categorised as “personal data” (or not) at the time when 
the data subject access application is made, based on the history of the  information to 
date16. There is no reference to any factors which might turn non-“personal data” into 
protected data in the hands of a data controller at some later date. One would hope 
that such an interpretation would however recommend itself to a later court: 
especially given the second clause of the definition of personal data in s 1(1) of the 
1998 Act, which clearly contemplates future events being relevant to the classification 
of information as  personal data  (data may become personal data when combined 
with “other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the 
possession of, the data controller”) [italics added].  Any other approach would also 
apparently breach Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) as it 
would mean there was no legal remedy in UK courts for a breach of the Art 8 right to 
respect for private life, as upheld in Peck v UK17. 
It seems likely that Durant as a whole may soon hopefully appear before the 
European Court of Justice for review18. At that stage, this commentator would hope 
for a different outcome, which respects the basic principle that personal privacy as a 
policy goal in the DP framework, should lead to a primary focus on the rights of the 
data subject whose image is captured, not on the procedures and administrative 
overhead of the data controller who captures the image.  The impact of Durant on 
legal regulation of CCTV is particularly important in the UK, which, to most people’s 
ignorance and lack of concern, is well on the way to becoming the “surveillance 
society” of Big Brother bad dreams: not because of the much trumpeted menace of ID 
                                                
16Ibid, paras 24-31.
17  (2003) ECHR Application No. 44647/98.
18 http://www.outlaw.com , 19-05-2994, reported that  Durant had filed papers with the European 
Commission claiming the UK government has not implemented the Data Protection Directive 
correctly.
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cards but because of the so ubiquitous as almost to be invisible pervasive growth of 
semi covert surveillance by CCTV. The Independent newspaper has estimated that 
over 4 million cameras are being used in the UK, 20% of all the CCTV cameras in use 
in the world, and that the average Briton is caught on camera 300 times a day19.   Such 
blanket CCTV coverage has, it is claimed, many conspicuous benefits in terms of 
crime detection, prevention and prosecution, and the building of public trust.  
However in a world of such singular Panopticism, it is vitally important that the 
principal legal control over CCTV  which data subjects have – data protection law –
should not be interpreted in a way which diminishes its value to the non-criminal 
citizen who is merely seeking to protect their privacy, as is their inalienable human 
right.
                                                
19 http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/this_britain/story.jsp?story=480364 .
